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LIABILITY SUB GROUP MEETING
19 MARCH 2002
151 BUCKINGHAM PALACE ROAD, LONDON SW1

MINUTES

Note: These are the views of the sub-group, not necessarily of the full Commission

Present

Phil Dale
Matthew Freeman
John Gilliland
Malcolm Grant
Derek Langslow
Sue Mayer
Roger Turner

Anne Packer (Secretariat)

Graham Davis (DEFRA)

Apologies

1. Justine Thornton was away and had sent her apologies.

Discussions with David Howarth, Department of Land Economy, University of Cambridge

2. Sue Mayer, convening the group for this meeting, welcomed David Howarth from the Department of Land Economy, Cambridge University, to informal discussions. David Howarth talked to the group about issues associated with liability and GMOs, using slides on the theme ‘Law, Economics and Justice – An Agenda’. A copy of the text of these slides is at Annex A.

3. The focus of his talk would be on private law and civil liability, that is where the claimant is a private party. This contrasts with the approach of the European draft Directive in which the plaintiff would always be the Government of a Member State. In looking at economic issues concerning the conflict between GM and organic farming, much hinges on the accreditation rules. These are related in indirect ways to consumer preference and trade association decisions, but it is difficult to assess the strength of the linkage. The conflict between a GM farmer and an organic farmer can be conceived of as a problem concerning the use of someone else’s property. It is useful also to consider the situation in reverse – that organic farmers could be thought of as using their neighbour’s land in a specific sense. There are analogies with the old issue of fencing in versus fencing out cattle from land. In discussing whether it should matter who got there first, David Howarth said common law is not interested in this: who got there first is thought of as essentially arbitrary, and a bias to the status quo is not necessarily appropriate. Though it might be difficult to apply reversal in practice, in principle it is highly relevant.

4. There would be a range of possible remedies via civil courts. It is important to consider not just granting an injunction to deal with the future and damages to compensate for past losses. It might be possible, for example, to order damages without issuing an injunction (or to issue an injunction only on condition that the victim pays compensation to the polluter). With damages measures, if there were an injunction damages would be oriented to the past ie be backward looking, while if there were no injunction, damages would be oriented to the future. The concept of reciprocity, namely confronting each side with the consequences of applying to itself the rule it wants to impose on the other side, could be an interesting way of encouraging dialogue, though not necessarily of predicting outcomes.

5. In discussion, members said they valued the challenging approach of looking at situations reciprocally; David Howarth commented that it could be said that there were no public interests beyond the interests of reasonable people. Members commented that issues were not simply based on organic and GM farming – for example the majority of farming would be conventional rather than either organic or GM and for oilseed rape it would be conventional non-GM production which would be most likely to be affected. They asked how the division of rights would be influenced by any thresholds that might be set by Government. David Howarth said that in both BSE and foot and mouth the Government has both set standards and paid compensation, and that this might provide a possible model.

6. Members said they would probably need to look at damage to environmental goods going beyond traditional damage – aspects of the latter might be quite well covered by civil law. David Howarth said his forthcoming article in the Washburn Law Journal discussed areas that can’t be dealt with by civil liability, eg known interests of unknown people in the future, which include biodiversity. Civil liability depends on a victim both being aware of harm and acting – when this was not applicable there might be a need for more direct state action. Members discussed possible diffuse issues, where it could be virtually impossible to prove causation - David Howarth said that when there was no way to attribute costs or causation, general taxation was a fall-back. A court in California had adopted the approach of ‘market share’ liability, with costs in proportion to market shares. This possibility had not been explored in Britain since group actions have not been possible until recently and were still not full class action suits in the US sense.

7. Members thanked David Howarth for his very useful contribution to the group’s understanding of the issues.

Raising the profile of liability issues

8. Members confirmed as agreed at the previous meeting that any future articles to raise the profile of liability issues, associated with the AEBC should have advance agreement from the sub-group.

Discussion

9. Members agreed that the afternoon’s discussion would focus primarily on:
  • the extent to which GMOs were different in liability terms;
  • unforeseen effects;
  • strict and fault based liability.
10. The group agreed that thinking was now beginning to crystallise on some issues. It would soon need to get to grips with issues on economic and environmental liability, where they would be distinct and where they might overlap or shade into each other for example. It would want to consider and test the limits to liability regimes – what they can and can’t do – and where they fit alongside regulation and management. There could be types of damage not appropriate to cover in a liability regime. The starting point would be to identify what should be protected and then consider how best to do so. The Government has responsibilities for ensuring there are appropriate rules for private litigation and for things that can’t properly be dealt with by private law, including biodiversity for example.

11. European environmental liability legislation would be limited both in content and in geographical areas covered. The group would want to consider how to link that to what would be needed in the UK. In terms of timescale, European legislation would take a number of years, and any UK domestic legislation would also take time, whereas decisions on any commercialisation of GM crops following the completion of the FSEs would probably be on a faster timescale.

12. Members concluded they would not consider GMOs as very different for liability from conventionally bred varieties or other forms of intervention which could be damaging, and thus the issues on liability needed to be seen from that perspective. While GMOs posed new issues, so did other agricultural technologies and a regime which covered all hazards to the environment might be most appropriate. If there were damage, methods of redress could be more important than the way the damage occurred, and the group would consider how an existing regime could deal with novel kinds of damage.

13. Members agreed that the tolerance threshold would define what is described as ‘damage’, in the case of economic harm, and agreed they would consider how to approach the concept of ‘novelty’, which would include other agricultural technologies to develop new crops and foods– the approach used in Canada. (The approach to novel foods in the UK of not previously being used in Europe would probably not be appropriate for liability.) It was noted that the group would need to consider its conclusions carefully alongside concerns over introduction of GMOs, and consider the issues in context.

Next steps and next meetings

14. Members agreed that it would be useful to develop scenarios to provide more specific examples to test out some of the principles, covering both economic and environmental aspects, and including unforeseen effects and complexity. The secretariat would work up some possible scenarios for initial discussion at the next sub-group meeting, and members would pass on any suggestions for inclusion to Anne Packer. DEFRA might have be able to help with an input on these.

Action: Secretariat

15. It could be useful to have an evidence taking session. The group would want to be clear about the objectives and from whom it wanted to take evidence in a more formal way than up to now.

16. Before the next meeting, the secretariat would draft a short discussion paper drawing out the big issues and main principles debated by the group and emerging conclusions. This would provide the basis for a discussion paper for the full Commission. The secretariat had expanded and circulated the draft outline structure for a report in the light of the recent full Commission meeting. The secretariat would subsequently expand and circulate a revised outline draft liability report.

Action: Secretariat

17. As arranged at the previous meeting, Roger Turner had been in touch with biotechnology industry contacts to invite them to the next meeting of the sub-group on 25 April. The secretariat had followed that up on behalf of the group by writing formally to Stephen Smith at the Agricultural Biotechnology Council, to invite him and colleagues to discussions at 11.00am.

18. The next sub-group meeting date was confirmed as 25 April, starting at 10.30am. That would be followed by the full AEBC meeting in Cardiff on 9-10 May.

AEBC Secretariat
March 2002

ANNEX A: Text of David Howarth’s slides

GM and Liability Law, Economics and Justice An Agenda

The Organic Farmer Problem
  • GM contamination causes organic farmer to lose accreditation
  • Causes of loss
    • Contamination
    • Accreditation Rules
    • Consumer preferences
    • Organic farmer’s career choice
Using Someone Else’s Property
  • The GM farmer is using the organic farmer’s land as part of GM production
  • Should the GM farmer
    • (a) be allowed to do so at all?
    • (b) if so, should the GM farmer have to pay for the privilege (and if so, how much? Or rather who says how much, organic farmer or court?)
Reversal
  • But it is also true in reverse:
    • The organic farmer is using the GM farmer’s land in the sense of requiring a cordon sanitaire around the organic farm
    • Fencing in vs fencing out of cattle
    • Role of the accreditation standards in requiring cordon sanitaire
      • Effectively a proxy battle
Objections to reversal
  • Who got there first?
  • ‘Physical’ interference requirements in present law?
  • But an imposition nevertheless if allowed to prevail
Possible Remedies via civil courts
  • None - GM wins
  • Injunction and compensation - Organic wins
  • Compensation only
    • compulsory purchase at price set by court
  • Reverse compensation
    • GM farmer has to stop if organic farmer pays GM farmer a sum set by court
    • (nb ‘option’ parallel)
Damages measures
  • If injunction, damages are oriented to the past (eg clean-up or reasonable fee)
  • If no injunction, damages are oriented to the future (‘user-principle’ capitalised royalty)
  • Beware the account of profits
Which rule to choose? 1
  • Coase Theorem Approach
    • ‘if court gets decision wrong, parties will contract around’ - but often doesn’t work
      • transactions costs
      • acrimony
    • But ‘award right to party which would value it most in the absence of transactions costs’ difficult to operationalise
      • endowment effect
      • evidence
Which rule to choose? 2
  • But Coase Theorem does show that essentially the decision is distributional
    • Whichever side has the right is, to that extent, richer
  • The question is therefore what is the fair approach
    • Can’t avoid political nature of choice
    • ‘Science’ vs ‘Opinion’ = does having the support of scientific opinion mean that you deserve to be richer?
Which rule to choose? 3
  • Fairness as Equality
    • Bias in favour of the poorer party
  • Fairness as Reciprocity
    • eg ‘how would you like it’, ‘you cut and I choose’, the veil of ignorance
    • common law nuisance
  • Reciprocity unless undermined by inequality
Which rule to choose? 4
  • To what extent does organic farmer accept that organic farmers should also have to stop if required to do so by the rules of GM farmer’s trade association?
  • To what extent does GM farmer accept that GM farmers should also have no right to stop physical interference in their crops?
Reciprocity and the Organic Farmer
  • ‘I would only accept that I should stop organic farming if required to do so by the rules of the GM farmer’s trade association if:
    • Those rules were ‘reasonable’ or
    • Those rules were necessary for an important public purpose or
    • Those rules had a scientific basis or
    • I get compensation measured on X basis’
Reciprocity and the GM Farmer
  • ‘I would accept that other farmers could physically interfere with my crops by their own activities if:
    • My physical yield is the same or
    • The saleability of my crops is the same or
    • My trade association still accepts me
    • I get compensation measured on X basis’
Solomonic Judgment
  • Threaten each side with their own point of view turned on themselves and see what they say
  • Carry out a veil of ignorance exercise
    • Which rule would a reasonable person choose if they did not know whether they were to be a GM farmer or an organic farmer?
  • Would the compensation/ reverse compensation rules emerge?
Bibliography
  • Ian Ayres, Protecting Property With Puts 32 Val. U.L. Rev. 793 (1998)
  • Ian Ayres and J.M. Balkin Legal Entitlements as Auctions: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Beyond (1996) 106 Yale L.J. 703
  • Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 Yale L.J. 1027 (1995)
  • G Calabresi & A D Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089 (1972)
  • R Coase, The Problem of Social Cost 3 Journal of Law and Economics 1 (1960)
  • W Farnsworth, “Do Parties to Nuisance Actions Bargain After Judgment?” in CASS SUNSTEIN, BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (Cambridge UP, 2000)
  • Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 713 (1996)
  • Madeline Morris, The Structure of Entitlements, 78 Cornell L. Rev. 822 (1993)
  • J Rachlinski & F Jourden, Remedies and the Psychology of Ownership 51 Vand. L. Rev. 1541 (1998)
  • JOHN RAWLS (ERIN KELLY ed.) JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS (Harvard UP, 2001)
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